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I.

INTRODUCTION

To the extent that they are not repressed, my memories of law
school as a student are of a world of progressive disappointment. My

unexceptional emotional trajectory from aspiration to estrangement and
from optimism to fear reflected, in part, the privilege of my background
and, in part, the intellectual paucity of "school law" in England.' Law
school stole my hopes of change and robbed me of any surviving sense
of the relevance of my inner world, of poetry, desire or dream, to the life
of the institution. My experience of law school was of the denial of the

relevance of my experience of law school. The irony of that paradox, of
the experience of repression as a mode of knowing, of the embodiment
of denial as a mode of being, is the secret of the school's success as a
rite of reproduction: an institutionally managed trauma gives birth to a
conforming or believing soul.2
* Corporation of London Professor of Law, Department of Law, Birkbeck College,
University of London. This review has benefited immeasurably from the encouragement and
participation of Linda Mills, without which it would not have been written.
1. 1 borrow the term "school law" from W.T. Murphy, Reference Without Reality: A
Comment on a Commentary on Codifications of Practice, 1 LAW AND CRITIQUE 61 (1990). This
article refers to school law as the form of commentary taught in law school:
The principal genre of school law is commentary. Students are assigned carefully
delimited texts to read for the next class, whether or not these texts are appended to
a problem. Yet what are such "exercises" about? Is more at stake here than
debating ... whether God could have become a cucumber or a beetle rather than a
man? In what sense is school law a "discipline?"
Id. at 62.
2. This biographically explicit and psychoanalytically informed analysis of law school has
been well represented within critical legal studies, critical race theory and feminist legal thought.
For diverse examples, see Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Trainingfor Hierarchy, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 40 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Duncan Kennedy, Psycho-Social CLS: A

Comment on the Cardozo Symposium, 6 CARDozo L. REV. 1013 (1985); Peter Rush, Killing Me
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To the extent that they are repressed, my memories of law school
are repeated, often in inverted forms, in my practice as a teacher of law.
This repetition, unsurprisingly, has its origins in my student experiences
of law school, but has its most intense and prolonged expression in my
academic life: it is lived out obscurely in personal forms of non-communication and in institutional forms of non-relationship. This repetition can be formulated in the dual terms of the trauma and the
insignificance of school law. The trauma has been well documented in
novels, dramas and films as well as in academic and most usually selfconsciously "critical" legal self-reflection. The trauma is mundane and
concerns the isolation and impersonality, the elitism and relentless competitiveness, the objectivity and homosociality of law school. The
trauma produces the reasonable man, the "black-letter" lawyer, the dull
white face with one less thought each year. The insignificance concerns
the self-effacement of the scholar within an institution which does not
prize thought, but rather prestige, publication, the circulation of texts
and the manipulative repetition of standard argumentative forms.
The insignificance of scholarship to the law school expresses the
predominant epistemic form of law: it is a knowledge which is rigorously separated from any being that knows-in this sense the persona of
judge or professor or lawyer is mystical, a status rather than a beingand it is a knowledge which denies the significance of thought and
thereby allows for the reproduction, the repetition, of established legal
forms. The mechanism of repetition institutes repression and does not
necessarily distinguish between traditional and radical, black-letter and
critical expositors of law. 3 The critics who live (and relive) the trauma
of school law in the self-conscious form of subversion, rebellion or
resistance to the norms of an externally defined law are likely to be as
authoritarian, competitive, status conscious, elitist and existentially and
politically lost in relation to their critical knowleges of law as are their
traditional counterparts in relation to the more recognised forms of trans-

Softly with his Words: Hunting the Law Student, 1 LAW
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).

AND CRITIQUE

21 (1990); PATRICIA

3. This point is made at length, and with characteristic acumen, in Lindsay Farmer, Bringing
Cinderella to the Ball: Teaching Criminal Law in Context, 58 MOD. L. REV. 756, 760 (1995)
(discussing a critical legal studies approach to criminal law). According to Farmer:
What is most immediately striking is that we are shown the mirror image of the
orthodox account. Where the law is allowed no internal theoretical unity, [the
critic] sees a unity in terms of its ideological purpose. Where one claims to be
formal and abstract, the other sees moral and political decisions being made. In
holding the mirror to conventional legal reasoning, [the critic] demands that it
recognise its true self ....
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mission of legal knowledge.' The power of law resides precisely in the
unconscious diversity of the forms of its repetition. The history of the
law school, and specifically a history written by a law professor, thus
faces at the very least a double task. It is first a biographical endeavour,
even if the expression of such biography takes the form of objective
distance, purported description or a more or less direct denial. Second,
it is a work of imagination, a work with a complex and somewhat indeterminate referent.' The history of law school, in this case of the English law school, is a history not simply of the forms of school law and of
the jurists-in Twining's account the "extraordinarily talented men" 6who established or maintained the school and its patterns of knowing. It
is also a history not only of a faculty in the university but of a moment
within the legal institution. The history of law school is a part of the
history of the formation and reproduction of lawyering and in that crucial facet it is a history of the relationship between or disjunction of
forms of knowing and patterns of practice.7 The history of law school
is, therefore, a part of the history of law and must take a certain responsibility not only for the narrative of the legal educational institution, but
must further endeavour to offer some account of the practice of law and
of its effects--of its violence as well as its knowledge-upon those who
come before or are otherwise affected by it.
William Twining's account of the modem English law school
offers a species of social anthropology of the institution. It adopts the
style of an objective description of the various activities, the development, purpose, curriculum, scholarship and resources of the law school.
Twining's history is, I will argue, both an unwitting product and a brilliant expression of the culture of the English law school. In somewhat
brutal terms, it is impersonal, status conscious, masculine and as
divorced from the history and experience of students as it is from the
impact of law upon the lives of those subjected to it. In offering such an
4. I elaborate this point in Peter Goodrich, Sleeping with the Enemy: An Essay on the
Politics of CriticalLegal Studies in America, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 389 (1992).

5. Murphy, supra note 1, at 66:
The distance between law school and everyday life is sufficiently great to permit not
only simulations but fantasy. The most Rococo fantasy of all which is engendered
through this process is the fantasy of law itself. It engenders, in particular, the idea
that "law" has some "essence," or, if it seems that this essence is hard to track down,
the conviction that it should not be so.
Teaching law, in consequence, implies teaching of an essence, "teaching the law 'as it is' or the
law 'as it should be' or how the law 'works in practice.'" Id. For a comparable argument in
relation to the American law school, see Pierre Schlag, Anti-Intellectualism, 16 CARDozo L. REv.
1111 (1995).
6. WILLIAM L. TWINING, BLAcKsTorNm's TOWER: THE ENGLISH LAW SCHOOL 25 (1994).
7. A point which is well and extravagantly made in DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING
AUTHORITY (1994).
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account, Twining faithfully expresses an elite vision of the law school
and at the same time propounds a liberal progressive's faith in scholarship and in the right of the law school to intellectual and cultural status.
In what follows, I will endeavour to supplement constructively the scope
of scholarship and the range or diversity of experiences upon which the
history of the English law school could usefully draw. My principal
concern is to ask whose history or experience this narrative of the law
school represents. I will be concerned, secondarily though correlatively,
with the diverse forms of knowing that a more plural history would
represent.
II.

HISTORY AND OTHER METAPHORS OF DISTANCE

Professor Twining has had a lengthy, laudable and progressive
career within legal education. Educated at Oxford University, he has
taught law extensively in Africa, America, Hong Kong, and Northern
Ireland as well as in England. For most of his career, he has been concerned directly, at a governmental level as well as at that of the university, with the reform of legal education and with the expansion of the
range of legal scholarship. 8 He is self-consciously a "modern" legal
scholar, and has been lengthily and highly successfully responsible for
promoting the study of "law in context" from a range of interdisciplinary
perspectives. He has been a consultant in the establishment and in the
reform of numerous law schools in Britain and in the commonwealth.
He has sat on many committees and written innumerable reports on the
state and fate of the curriculum and the academic profession of law.
Professor Twining's view of legal education is, in short, understandably
Olympian.
The image of the tower conveys well some of the aura of achievement and influence, of the doing of "Great Things," which Twining's
work embodies. More than that, it is a significant and, at times, unconscious figure of the role, the culture, gender and ethos of the law school.
In Twining's account, the tower has two principal significances. The
first is drawn from the history of the Eiffel Tower: "[I]t is the only place
in Paris," Maupassant is said to have remarked, "where I don't have to
see it."9 The second connotation develops from the first, allowing the
8. For indicative works, see LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW (William L. Twining ed.,

1986) (arguing for the inseparability of legal theory and the doctrinal study of law); WILLIAM
TWINING & DAVID MIERS, How TO DO THINGS WITH RULES (1991) (a course book in contextual

legal methods); William L. Twining, Reading Law, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1989) (suggesting
imaginative alternatives to the contemporary legal curriculum); William L. Twining, Treatisesand
Textbooks, A Reply to TB. Smith, 12 J. Soc'v PUB. TCHRS. L. 267 (1973) (attacking the textbook
tradition as both irrational and intellectually impoverished).
9. TWINING, supra note 6, at 190.
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adoption of a "bird's eye, top-down, view," and reminding us that history is an exercise of construction and imagination commensurate with
the complexity of human experience.' 0 Such connotations of distance
and of vantage point are in one sense unexceptional. In a more historically and biographically informed reading, however, the metaphor of the
tower is symptomatic of a structural separation or void. The tower,
whether prison, fortification, or skyscraper, isolates its occupants and, as
panopticon, fortress, or viewpoint, it surveys and disciplines a landscape. In such a sense the tower is undoubtedly a fecund metaphor, but
it is not as innocent-or purely metaphoric-as it appears.
Within the early modem history of law the tower is a metaphor of
jurisdiction. In the depiction of ecclesiastical law the tower, specula
pastoralisor pastoral watchtower, was the site from which the pontiff,
bishop or judge would survey both the external behaviour and the internal dispositions of his subjects." The tower signified a dual jurisdiction, an external regulation and an inner governance of the soul. The
ecclesiastical law, of course, had its various tangible or written forms;
but it also had another territory, an invisible or "ghostly power," which
domain was that of the jurisdiction of conscience and the law of the
heart. It was also clear that, no matter how evanescent its domain, the
jurisdiction of the pastoral tower connoted a strict sense of hierarchy:
"[T]o sit in a higher room, what is this but to have a primacy or superiority" over others. 2 The hard part of resurrecting this metaphor is not so
much, however, the recollection of the hierarchy or militarism of its use,
but rather the gender of its performance.
The tower as a symbol of ecclesiastical jurisdiction is tied explicitly
to a "law of the father" and to patrisitic impositions of a pre-ordained
truth.' 3 From surprisingly early on in the history of common law, the
ecclesiastical law was a part of the secular jurisdiction. It instituted a
paternal metaphor of law within the subject and governed an inner polity
of masculine legal souls. We may simply note that within that jurisdiction there were only men. It was not even clear, in the context of a

10. Id. at 191.
11. The definition is taken from a post-Reformation polemic, THOMAS STAPLETON, A
RETURNE OF UNTRUTHES UPON M. JEWELL 57r (n.p. 1566). For discussion of the "ghostly
powers," see PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEX: HISTORY, PSYCHOANALYSIS, LAW 228-34 (1995).
12. STAPLETON, supra note 11, at 57r.
13. The principal constitutional source of this paternal metaphor is RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE
LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY (Ernest Rhys ed., J.M. Dent & Co. 1907) (1593 or 1594-1600).
For contemporary discussion of the metaphor, see PIERRE LEGENDRE, LES ENFANTS Du TEXTE.
ETUDE SUR LA FONCTION PARENTALE DES ETATS (1992); and Alain Pottage, The PaternityofLaw,
in POLITICS, POSTMODERNITY AND CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Costas Douzinas et al. eds., 1994).
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lengthy theological and legal debate, whether women had a soul. 14
What was evident by the end of the sixteenth century was that women
lacked legal personality or public presence. Law's tower was literally
and metaphorically a masculine affair. When Blackstone introduced the
study of common law to the English university as "the proper accomplishment of every gentleman and scholar,"' 5 he drew upon a long tradition of class, race and gender privilege.
To move to a modem idiom, the tower is still a gendered symbol.
It is the expression of a masculine law and landscape, and it signifies
power through a verticality which in both popular and architectural
imagination connotes a phallic control:
Regardless of the complex historical processes through which links
between power and verticality have been created and sustained in a
variety of cultures, a popular association with the phallus is... widespread: whether signifying religious or commercial [or legal] power,
verticality operates via a key symbol of masculinity. Although most
academic commentators pass this by, almost as if it is too crude to be
taken seriously, it is graphically illustrated by the jokes that play on
words like "erection". The [tower] speaks loudly of the masculine
character of capital.' 6
By the same token, the tower as a metaphor of law school must be
recognised as connoting not simply a higher viewpoint, but a higher
place, a status, a gender, a hierarchy of governance.
In its internal depiction and workings, the panoptic tower, as Foucault elaborated so well, was a formative architectural trope in the development of modem carceral and disciplinary regimes. 7 The panopticon,
as set out by Bentham, was the most modem form of prison construction, one which isolated and separated the inmates so as to place them
face to face with their conscience. In this disciplinary form, the tower
symbolised and embodied a species of moral science, a secular reform or
control of the soul.'" It ruled through an inexplicit or intemalised terror.
Its greatest efficacy was its fantasmatic structure, the fact that the subject
of discipline was its bearer and enforcer, and that its jurisdiction was the
mind. If the law school is a tower, it will follow that it seeks not only to
institute a masculine subjectivity, but also that it trains its subjects in
exemplary forms of self-governance, that it produces captives or prison14. This debate is well discussed in IAN MACLEAN, THE RENAISSANCE NOTION OF WOMAN
(1980).
15. WILLIAM L. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (1765).
16. Liz Bondi, Gender Symbols and Urban Landscapes, 16 PROGREss HUM. GEOGRAPHY 157,
160 (1990).
17. See ROBIN EVANS, THE FABRICATION OF VIRTUE: ENGLISH PRISON ARCHITECTURE
(1982); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (1977).
18. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON OR INSPECTION HOUSE (n.p. 1787).
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ers of law. The tower in this aspect represents quite directly the historical function, the unadorned disciplinary role of a training in law as a
preparation for practice. The law school tower is a species of prison and
demands a sacrifice on the part of its subjects. The legislation of the
Inns of Court in the sixteenth-century was explicit. Outsiders or
"foraigners" were to be excluded, temperance was demanded, and every
detail of diet, dress, religious observance, lifestyle, company and behaviour was regulated. 19 The student or apprentice in law was to be stoical, sad, and studious. Even in the earliest apologetic legal treatises it
was well recognised that studying law was the work of many years and
would inevitably shorten life expectancy and "waste the greatest part of
the verdour and vigour of our youth."2 0
Twining captures well certain dimensions of the conflict between
professional interests, vocational imperatives and educational concerns.
He wants scholarship to have a higher status or cultural place; he wants
the law school to be integrated fully into the university; he wants legal
studies to be an interdisciplinary, autonomous academic enterprise, and
specifically to break loose of the coercive shackles and mundane
demands of the practising profession. In this light, the tower also stands
to protect the scholar from the realms of practice and the pressures of the
polity. It creates a higher place within which the professor of law can
return to his traditional role as lux a tenebris, as an oracle, "a starr in the
firmament of the Commonwealth. ' 21 I have no doubt that this is a radical claim or project, but it is also somewhat ambivalent or paradoxical.
Does scholarship thrive when separated from polity and politics? Can
knowledge be said to have an object when it is self-consciously cut
adrift from its responsibilities and its implications in practice? Does not
legal rhetoric become decadent, as Tacitus lengthily observed, when its
or relevance to the constudents debate law points without influence
22
cerns of either government or lawyers?
A consistent theme of the history of legal education in most common law countries, Twining claims, "is the low prestige of law schools
and the low status of academic lawyers, both in the eyes of the univer19. The legislation and rules are well described in

WILLIAM

DUGDALE,

ORIGINES

JURIDICIALES OR HISTORICAL MEMORIALS OF THE ENGLISH LAWS, COURTS OF JUSTICE, FORMS OF

188-92 (n.p. 1666). For discussion, see GOODRICH, supra note I1, at 1-7.
20. SIR JOHN DODERIDGE, THE ENGLISH LAWYER 29 (n.p. 1631). Sir Edward Coke makes
similar remarks in SIR EDWARD COKE, A BOOK OF ENTRIES CONTAINING PERFECT AND APPROVED
PRESIDENTS OF COURTS A5a (n.p. 1610).
21. SIR JOHN DAVIES, A DISCOURSE OF LAW AND LAWYERS (1615), reprintedin 2 COMPLETE
WORKS 279 (A.B. Grosart ed., n.p. 1876). For discussion, see PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF
LAW 139-48 (1990); W.T. Murphy, The Oldest Social Science? The Epistemic Propertiesof the
Common Law Tradition, 54 MOD. L. REV. 171 (1991).
22. CORNELIUS TACITUS, DIALOGUE OF ORATORS 127-33 (1911).
TRYAL
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sity and in the eyes of the profession."2 Even in academic terms, "the
subject was a late-comer to English universities and for a long time it
had low prestige within the academy and in the eyes of the profession;"
it was but one "relatively small and insignificant part of the humanities
and social sciences. 24 Popular perceptions of the legal academic invoke
an image of the neurotic, the introvert, the failed practitioner, the silent,
the inaccessible, the retired and the retiring. At the level of sources of
law, a comparable low status, whereby primary sources "dwarf" secondary literature, is bemoaned: "The main primary sources, legislation and
statutes, are far more extensive and continually proliferating; they also
are authoritative texts, which trump even the most respected juristic
writings: Coke, Blackstone, Salmond, and Cross are writers of authority, but they can be overriden on a specific point by the decision of even
' 25
an inferior court."
In Twining's view, the law school has never gained the recognition
or the status to which he appears to believe that it is entitled. However,
it is not very clear what it has done in England to earn such a title or to
merit a prestige equivalent to that of the judiciary who on occasion so
gainfully overrule or simply ignore the writings and opinions of academics." Put more strongly, it is unclear why legal academics should gain a
"higher place" or act as equals to an archaic and tradition-bound establishment elite. It is unclear how the accepted legal academic conception
of scholarship, a mixture of "reportage" and interstitial comment and
criticism either warrants greater status or would benefit significantly if
such status were conferred.27
The issue of the status of the English law school and of the social
class of entrants to the profession has a much longer history than Twin23. TWINING, supra note 6, at 25.
24. Id. at 27-28.
25. Id. at 113.
26. A recent example, and one to which Twining could justifiably object, is the overruling of
the leading English contract writers, Professor Patrick Atiyah, Professor Gunther Treitel, and
Professor Michael Furmston, on the appropriate construction of section 2(1) of the
Misrepresentation Act of 1967. Lord Justice Balcombe, giving judgment in Royscot Trust Ltd. v.
Rogerson, 3 All E.R. 294, 300 (1991), simply observes that:
With all respect to the various learned authors whose works I have cited above, it
seems to me that to suggest that a different measure of damage applies to an action
for innocent misrepresentation under the section than that which applies to an action
for fraudulent misrepresentation (deceit) at common law is to ignore the plain words
of the subsection and is inconsistent with the cases to which I have referred.
The fact that the purported "plain meaning" was not plain to at least three leading law professors,
and that on its surface the meaning which Lord Justice Balcombe attributed to the anaphoric
phrase "shall be so liable" in the relevant statutory section, led to the extraordinary and arguably
unsatisfactory result that an innocent misrepresentor would be faced with a punitive level of damages, did not inhibit his Lordship. See id. at 298.
27. TWINING, supra note 6, at I11.
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ing acknowledges or reports. Viewed in a slightly broader perspective,
the English law school long predates the modem university system of
law degrees. The model of law school was practice and the exemplary
institutions of such instruction were the Inns of Court, Coke's "third
university" which, according to one contemporary, "might .. . be as

worthily styled a university as either Angers or Orleans in France, or as
Pavia or Perugia in Italy, wherein the study of civil law, is only
professed."2
The Inns of Court offered a curious yet expansive tutelage in manners as well as in rhetoric, in revelry as well as in ritual, in diet as well
as in dress, in religion as well as in law. What is interesting about such a
history and institution in the present context is not the detail of the training in gentility and deportment, nor the thoroughly elitist and exclusory
atmosphere of the Bar; but rather, the haphazard combination of scholarship and practice, and correlatively of education and status. The paradox is that, insofar as the legal academy seeks greater prestige, it is
likely to be drawn away from scholarship and back towards practice by
the exigency of making itself more marketable. This conflicts with
Twining's more radical scholarly claims and suggests a misapprehension: the critical issue is not that of raising the status of legal academics
but rather that of dethroning the judges and removing the mystical aura
or sacral pretence of the lawyers. A critical pedagogy of law is not a
matter of status or distance but rather of proximity and engagement.
III.

SCHOLARLY AND CRITICAL PRACTICES

The example of the Inns of Court and the community or university
of practice has an ambivalent yet obsessive role within the English legal
academy. The attraction of the Bar has always been its class, its status
and its power. Even in its halcyon years in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries the Inns of Court did not win praise through scholarship or
pedagogy. In fact, the English Bar had always seemed derivative, parochial and unlearned to outsiders, uncritical and exploitative to those antiquaries and scholars who sojourned within it, or close to it, for any
length of time.2 9 Twining is at his most perceptive and persuasive when
28.

SIR EDWARD COKE,

3

REPORTS

C5a (n.p. 1777); Sir George Buc, The Third Universitie of

England,reprinted in JOHN STOW, THE ANNALES OR GENERAL CHRONICLE OF ENGLAND 966 (n.p.
1615). Blackstone refers to the "juridical university," BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at 25. See
generally WILFRID R. PREST, THE RISE OF THE BARRISTERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH

BAR 1590-1640 (1986).
29. The earliest example is probably ERASMuS, Opus EPISTOLARUM 17 (1922), who referred
to common lawyers as being "as far as is possible from true learning." For others they were the
most unlearned of learned professions, a view which certain English scholars willingly affirmed.
See, e.g., ABRAHAM FRAUNCE, THE LAWIERS LOGIKE, EXEMPLIFYING THE PRAECEPTS OF LoGIKE

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:901

he turns to criticise the limited perception and the lack of confidence
which characterise much of contemporary legal scholarship. In terms of
scholarship, the English law school labours under the fantasm of certainties that other disciplines have long eschewed, and repeats traditional
patterns of formal instruction or transmission of information which have
long lacked any educational justification. a
The manifest thesis of Blackstone's Tower is in this respect the
argument that legal studies are slowly but inexorably being drawn into
the general intellectual culture and that, in recognition or furtherance of
this movement or epistemic shift, the law school should finally identify
itself unequivocally and fully with its educational context. The English
law school of the modem period is specifically an academic institution;
it has very little responsibility for the process of professional formation
of its subjects, and in consequence both had and has a high degree of
freedom in its choice of identity and scholarly objectives. 31 The law
school, in Twining's view, should build upon this freedom, this power to
define itself; it should "move more boldly" in the direction of diversification of function, and place much greater emphasis on "advanced and
interdisciplinary studies. 3 2 The vocational model of legal education
should, therefore, gradually give way to a general arts degree in law
which provides as much for non-lawyers or for those who intend nothing
more than an academic study of law. The law school would thus come
to value a culture of research, and specifically, intellectual diversity of
research, postgraduate studies and higher degrees, much more than has
traditionally been the case.
In arguing for the primacy of scholarship and the correlative freedom of adopting methods and subject-matter from other disciplines,
Twining is both a radical and a stringent critic of the legal academic
BY THE EXAMPLE OF COMMON LAW (n.p. 1588); SIR ROBERT WISEMAN, THE LAW OF LAWS; OR
THE EXCELLENCY OF THE CIVIL LAW (n.p. 1664). Both works are discussed in Peter Goodrich,

Critical Legal Studies in England: Prospective Histories, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 196 (1992).
30. On the scholarship of the English law school, see IAN GRIGG-SPALL & PADDY IRELAND,
THE CRITICAL LAWYERS' HANDBOOK (1992); David Sugarman, Legal Theory, the Common Law
Mind and the Making of the Textbook Tradition, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 26-62
(William L. Twining ed., 1986); Tim Murphy & Simon Roberts, Introduction, 50 MOD. L. REV.

677, 687 (1987) (special issue on legal education). On the educational practices of the English
law school, in addition to works cited, see Alan Thomson, Critical-Legal Education in Britain, 14
J.L. & Soc'Y 183 (1987).
31. TWINING, supra note 6, at 27-28.

32. Id. at 57. It should be noted here that the English law degree is an undergraduate
Bachelor's degree. It is in this respect potentially markedly less vocational than its American
counterpart. After law school, the English law student will need to continue in a one-year training
course run by the profession and then complete somewhat over two years practical training
(apprenticeship) in his or her chosen branch of the profession. The law school in England
explicitly constitutes what is termed the "academic stage" of legal education, and in Twining's
view it should take this intellectual role more seriously than it does at present.
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establishment in England. To argue that the law school is intrinsically a
part of the university-of "an aggregation of sovereignties connected by
a common heating plant" 33-is at its best both a powerful liberal indictment of current academic practices and a radical return to a much
broader and intellectually optimistic sense of the discipline. A legal
scholarship freed of the need to simulate professional knowledge and
liberated of the traditional role of pretending to report doctrinal developments as if such would have an influence upon the law, would be a
much more exciting, creative and uncertain intellectual enterprise. It
would return the study of law to the context of ethics. Were it not that
Twining is so resolutely forward looking, one could suspect that this
recourse to the arts was, in part, a nostalgia for a humanistic enterprise,
for a legal studies that treated law as one aspect of a pluralistic knowlege
of things divine and human ("rerum divinarum humanarumque scientia").3 4 The figure of Blackstone stands guard over just such an enterprise, although the significance which Twining accords to this
institutional work is unclear. The Commentaries purported to address
the "gentlemen of England" and indulged, in Twining's description, in
the time-honoured fantasy of the "resurrection and conservation of traditional common law, the values it embodies, evolutionary development
and legislative restraint," and which pleaded "to restore, preserve and
strengthen an ancient tradition which was under threat and which had
first by the Normans, and more recently by ad
already been damaged,
'35
hoc legislation.
The recourse to Blackstone, to the educational virtues of a gentlemanly knowledge and to immemorial myths of a pristine or original
common law also, however, return the reader to the metaphor of the
tower and the isolation of academic law. In epistemological terms it is
not always evident what the values or the status of an expanded legal
scholarship will transpire to be. On one side, the proposal of a new art
of academic law or legal studies comes close to the notion of an autonomous art; a legal studies for the sake of legal studies, without any necessary relation either to the experience of law or to the modes of knowing
that constitute its practices. The irony of this conception is, in part, that
it promotes a domain or institution within which legal scholars and their
33. Id. at 64. It is worth noting the irony that the author of this statement, Robert Maynard
Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago, was a lawyer by training and had spent the bulk
of his career as a law professor.
34. See SIR JOHN DODERIDGE, THE ENGLISH LAWYER: DESCRIBING A METHOD FOR THE
MANAGING OF THE LAWES OF THIS LAND 29 (n.p. 1631).

35. TWINING, supra note 6, at 131-32. One might compare this to GILBERT ABBOTT
A'BECKETr, THE COMIC BLACKSTONE I (rev. ed. n.p. 1887): "Every gentleman ought to know a
little of law, says Coke, and perhaps, say we, the less the better."
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studies are essentially without social being and lack any practical or ethical responsibility for what their institution produces. The failing of
such a conception is that of unconsciously repeating the traditional patterns of legal scholarship by virtue of refusing to recognise either the
politics of the legal academy itself or the reality of law's institutional
practices. On the other side of this sophisticated neutrality is an almost
exclusively narcissistic form of scholarship. Deprived of the legal world
or excluded from the ontology of law, the self becomes the law and a
slightly agonised narcissism becomes both the pleasure and the terror or
blankness of the academic legal text.3 6

The danger of a theory of pure legal scholarship is that it abdicates
the politics of the legal educational establishment, the internal and external and present and future relationships implied by the study of law.
The scholarly, just as much as the pedagogic, is an institutional function
and it implies a series of relationships within the law school, just as
much as it projects or produces a certain educational product, a legal
subject, an imbiber of law. Let us re-examine each dimension of this
institutional condition. On the one side, oblivion or at least a good measure of turreted seclusion from the world is highly unlikely to produce a
radical, creative or ethically responsible scholarship. Turning inwards,
in a gesture of unconscious repetition of an earlier experience of education, is hardly likely to make the homo academicus of the legal academy
a serious thinker, let alone a perceptive observer of the relationships
which constitute the law school and dominate its teaching. Twining
implies as much in a series of incidental remarks which paint a slightly
sepia image of the twilight world of law school and of its melancholic
and socially incompetent denizens. A few examples must suffice.
We are treated to a chapter on "The Law Library" which concludes
that "the law library is at the heart of academic legal culture.

37

Search-

ing for the meaning of this conclusion, it is interesting to note that,
although academic legal culture imagines that it writes so as to report,
criticise and develop the world of law, that is, of practice, judgment and
36. The most striking recent example of such a phenomenon is probably David Kennedy,
Autumn Weekends: An Essay on Law and Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 191-235
(Austin Sarat & Thomas Keams eds., 1993). Commissioned to write on law and everyday life,
Kennedy ignores the entire history and scholarship of phenomenological philosophy and

existential theories of the everyday, and determines instead that the conjunction of law and
everyday life is an exclusively individualistic affair. If the law professor is the law, then the law

in everyday life must be nothing more and nothing less than what the law professor does. With a
nicely ironic sensibility, Kennedy, therefore, treats the reader to a description of what he, the law

professor, the law, did on his holidays-presumably because for him holidays are the law. While
this position might just possibly make for entertaining narrative it cannot be viewed as
scholarship.
37. TWINING, supra note 6, at 117.
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legislation, practitioners pay little or no attention to the "pathological" 38
concerns of academics. For example, partners in a firm in Scotland were
reported to spend less than fifteen minutes per week referring to books,
but rather acquired their information about law by telephone and principally from non-lawyers. 39 Turning to the internal life of the librarybound legal academic, Twining remarks upon the psychosis of the common lawyers who have "quite understandably cherished and loved the
law reports; the trouble is that they have too often loved them to distraction and have become case-mad."40 It is tempting to imagine a clinical
condition, mad-lawyer disease, a softening of the brain or "biblio-spongiform encaphalopaphy."
Whatever else may be learned from the discussion of the library,
the activity of legal scholarship is curiously, but not inaccurately, drawn
in terms of what is at best an other-worldly irrelevance and at worst a
radical and doomed narcissism. As Twining remarks, "[in law, it is not
too difficult to get published; it may not be too easy to get read."'" It is
again impossible to avoid wondering about the significance of this exercise, or how did I or we find ourselves here, linked by nothing more
scholarly than a heating plant and the desultory bad habit of sending out
huge numbers of offprints of publications? What kind of life is it of
which it can be said that "jurisprudence is the lawyer's extroversion?"
What relationships hold sway in such an institution and- how could they
not be closely linked to the extraordinarily self-referential prison of legal
scholarship? Can it really be said, and if so, at what level of psychological or psychoanalytic understanding, that the law school has "no true
legal masochists,"42 or that no one there hates law?
In a chapter on "Law School Culture," there is a section titled "People." It includes an extraordinarily brief sub-section on "Secretaries," a
mere eleven lines. Of secretaries it is remarked that "they provide both
order and continuity," they alone "know the students and recognise the
alumnae," they "pin up postcards from wandering [or better, lost] scholars." To this it is added that they are in fact administrators and in the
last two lines we learn, quite accurately, that "they run the place, keep
out of departmental politics, and more than anyone else contribute to a
friendly atmosphere. 43 There is no mention that these secretaries are
38. Id.
39. Id.at 92-93.

40. Id.at 105.
41. Id.at 111.
42. Id.at 78.
43. Id. at 73. Having been involved in establishing a new law school, in the University of

London, I am particularly aware of the academic's reliance upon administrators and secretaries.
For instance, Valerie Hoare, who was appointed at the same time as I was, knew the University of
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women. There is no discussion of the powerlessness of these administrators or the appalling pay of these acting Deans. They are presumably
friendly because they are women. It is as women that they keep out of
politics, it is as women that they have a relationship with students, with
the most numerous subjects of the institution, and recognise alumnae, it
is as women that they pin up postcards, and it is presumably also as
women that they stay. Why is it assumed that this is unproblematic or
that it tells us so very little about law school and what it is properly
44
about?
What is significant is the apparent insignificance of the relationship
of the academic lawyer to exploitation and to the exploited. What is at
issue is the question of relationship itself and of the forms of relationship which law, and here the legal academy, institutes or inscribes. The
important point is not simply that Twining observes what he has been
trained to observe, that he repeats his own history in writing the history
of the law school. Twining's tower aptly depicts what pass for relationships within the law school and in consequence it tells us a considerable
amount about the ways of knowing that make up the epistemology of
law, and about the embodiments or practices of knowledge and of teaching which constitute the experience or education and training of the legal
academy. The academic, pedagogic and interpersonal relationships
within the law school directly reflect the scholarship of the law teacher
and are directly expressed in their teaching practice. A history of the
law school would do well to supplement the information it provides with
a more direct account of, and reflection upon, those relationships and the
knowledge or forms of life which they imply.
In writing about Twining-about Twining's Tower-I also write
about myself. My disappointments with his book are in many respects
disappointments with myself and they share a recognition of the limits
of my honesty or courage. The metaphor of the tower can serve to provide a final image, that of a highly visible imprisonment, of a captivity
from which the prisoner, in the courtly lyric a woman, desires rescue or
escape. In the modem terms of disciplinary logics, the body is the prisoner of the soul. To escape from that prison, in other words, is to trangress its rules of relationship and its obstacles to communication and to
London system much better than I did. During the first years of the Department she was clearly as
responsible as any of the academics for the tone of the Department and the structure of its
administration. Further, in many respects she played the role of the unconscious of the
Department in precisely the senses that Twining enumerates: building interpersonal spaces
between staff and accomodating or understanding the needs both of the students and of the
College.
44. To his great credit this is a question raised by DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY (1983).
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thought. It would be, in a sense, to inscribe the soul in different ways, to
foster communication, to speak through the mask and across the distance
and hierarchy of law. There can be no doubt that law school trains the
soul, that it institutes the culture of law through a hierarchical conception of knowledge and through a variety of techniques of separation,
isolation and fear. That English law schools remain hierarchical,
homosocial, ethnocentric and masculine domains is hardly an exceptional observation. To observe that I am hierarchical, homosocial, ethnocentric and trained most effectively in obscure, indirect, impersonal
and unfeeling forms of communication is a slightly more pertinent
reflection. To the extent that my memories of law school are not
repressed, I remain a student or at least attached to the person that a long
time ago entered Twining's Tower: I can still learn, I can still change
the future. To the extent that my memories of law school are not
repressed, I can still say of law school, of its tyrannies and its relationships, that they need not be thus.

